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Innocent but Incarcerated: Reforming Oklahoma’s 
Criminal Pretrial Procedures to Combat Discrimination 
Against Indigent Defendants 
Introduction 
Imagine a woman of thirty-two years of age. She works hard to make 
ends meet as a single mom, working two jobs and raising her two school-
aged children. But she can be too trusting and finds herself arrested for 
receiving stolen property.
1
 Unable to post $500 cash bond,
2
 let alone hire a 
private attorney, she sits in the local jail while her case trudges through the 
district court’s backlogged criminal docket. She loses both of her jobs and, 
adding insult to injury, accrues a daily jail fee that she would unmistakably 
prefer to avoid—if only she could afford to leave. 
She applies for free representation through her state’s contract attorney 
system and is declared indigent, but she faces a predicament once her 
family manages to scrape together enough money to secure her pretrial 
release. Should she allow them to post bail and risk losing appointed 
counsel, or remain in jail to ensure that she receives some minimum level of 
representation during pretrial proceedings and a potential trial? Faced with 
two bad options, she gives up, accepting a plea deal that allows her to return 
home to her kids, but at a high cost—five years of probation and a felony 
record that forever alters the trajectory of her life. 
While the crimes of arrest and particular circumstances vary among 
cases, this scenario is all too familiar for hundreds of thousands of poor 
defendants across the United States,
3
 and Oklahoma is no exception. 
According to the most recently reported Oklahoma State Bureau of 
                                                                                                             
 1. See generally 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1713 (2011 & Supp. 2019) (providing for 
punishment of up to eight years of incarceration upon conviction, depending on the value of 
the stolen property). 
 2. When an individual is charged with a crime, the judge who presides over the case 
generally sets a dollar amount that a defendant can pay to secure release from jail while the 
case is pending. The money paid into the court is returned if the defendant attends all court 
dates. If the individual cannot afford to pay the entire bail amount, they can pay a bail 
bondsman a portion of the amount in exchange for the bondsman’s promise to pay the full 
amount. Once the defendant attends all court dates, the bail amount is returned to the 
bondsman. 
 3. See generally Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html (explaining that nine out of ten 
inmates are held in state facilities and 60% of the roughly 750,000 people held in state jails 
are “innocent in the eyes of the law” having not yet been convicted). 
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Investigation statistics, approximately 130,000 Oklahomans are arrested 
every year, more than 111,000 of whom are arrested for non-violent 
crimes.
4
 Of those arrested, roughly 80% are poor enough to qualify for 
court-appointed representation.
5
 These indigent defendants, many of whom 
are already subject to unequal treatment at the hand of oppressive social and 
political systems,
6
 receive inadequate protections in the criminal justice 
system because they are poor and politically powerless.
7
 
Though the rights of indigent defendants are burdened at every stage of 
the criminal prosecution,
8
 they are most vulnerable during the early stages. 
Ensuring procedural fairness for the United States’ most vulnerable citizens 
is paramount during initial appearances because the judge’s determination 
of whether an arrestee must sit in jail for months or years pending 
resolution of the case prejudices every subsequent proceeding. Criminal 
justice reform advocates have long fought for widespread changes to state 
bail practices,
9
 and Oklahoma leaders must act decisively to curtail the 
state’s swelling incarceration crisis.
10
 
This Comment addresses the incarceration crisis and proposes methods 
for remedying disparate treatment of indigent persons by a system that was 
                                                                                                             
 4. OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, OKLA. STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
CRIME IN OKLAHOMA 2018, at 1-2–1-6 (2019). 
 5. See Lincoln Caplan, The Right to Counsel: Badly Battered at 50, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
9, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/opinion/sunday/the-right-to-counsel-badly-
battered-at-50.html; see also Christopher Zoukis, Indigent Defense in America: An Affront to 
Justice, CRIM. LEGAL NEWS (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2018/ 
mar/16/indigent-defense-america-affront-justice/. 
 6. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (exploring the “rebirth of a caste-like system in the 
United States”). 
 7. See Colin Warner, Justice Works in America for Those Who Can Buy It, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 23, 2017, 9:05 PM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/ 
spotlight/2017/08/23/justice-works-america-those-who-can-buy/586864001/. 
 8. Cf. Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years After 
‘Gideon’, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/ 
03/how-americans-lost-the-right-to-counsel-50-years-after-gideon/273433/ (suggesting that 
the right to an attorney “amounts to another unfunded mandate” because court-appointed 
attorneys are “almost certainly . . . vastly underpaid and grossly overworked”). 
 9. See, e.g., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, MANHATTAN BAIL PROJECT: OFFICIAL COURT 
TRANSCRIPTS OCTOBER 1961–JUNE 1962 (1962), https://www.vera.org/publications/ 
manhattan-bail-project-official-court-transcripts-october-1961-june-1962. 
 10. See Nicole McAfee, ACLU Official: It’s Time to End Mass Incarceration in 
Oklahoma, OKLAHOMAN (Sept. 9, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://oklahoman.com/article/5607524/ 
aclu-official-its-time-to-end-mass-incarceration-in-oklahoma. 
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designed to prey upon and perpetuate their misfortunes. Part I puts the state 
crisis into context, tracing the development of the American criminal justice 
system and identifying national trends that contribute to over-incarceration. 
Part II then discusses the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for indigent 
defendants, including how different states ensure this right. Part III 
examines Oklahoma’s indigent defense mechanism and highlights 
troublesome aspects that demand legislative attention. Finally, Part IV 
discusses reforms that legislators and other state leaders can and should 
implement. 
I. Putting the Crisis in Context 
To appreciate the importance of pretrial reforms, one must understand 
the gravity of the United States’ current incarceration crisis along with the 
underlying policies and power structures that perpetuate it. Despite 
relatively consistent national incarceration rates—around 100 prisoners per 
100,000 people—during the period from 1925 to 1975, the rate ballooned to 
over 500 prisoners per 100,000 people by 2008.
11
 By 2018, when the Prison 
Policy Initiative reported that the United States incarcerates residents at five 
to eighteen times the rate of other founding NATO countries, the 
incarceration rate had grown to nearly 700 prisoners per 100,000 people.
12
  
The troubling trend toward incarcerating primarily poor people without 
concern for economic, social, or other consequences is not a new 
phenomenon. However, the proliferation of inmates in the American 
criminal justice system has largely been caused by the confluence of four 
factors: shifting beliefs concerning the purpose of criminal punishment, 
criminalization of drug possession and other nonviolent activities, 
continued reliance on private prisons, and changing bail policies that 
impose a wealth-based test on criminal defendants’ pretrial freedom.
13
 
  
                                                                                                             
 11. Data Visualization: U.S. Incarceration Rate, 1925–2008: Prisoners per 100,000 
Population, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (2010), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/ 
incarceration1925-2008.html. 
 12. Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2018, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html. Of 
the twenty-three states with incarceration rates above the national average, Oklahoma sits 
atop the list at 1079 inmates per 100,000 people. Id. 
 13. See infra Section I.B. 
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A. The Early American Criminal Justice System 
Though the United States’ current status as the greatest incarcerator in 
the world
14
 evokes a feeling of disregard for individual liberty, the creation 
of its criminal justice system represented an almost altruistic step forward 
in the global theory of punishment during the Age of Enlightenment.
15
 
Shifting attitudes concerning government and authority led intellectuals like 
Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria to contemplate an ideal method of 
punishment at a time when English courts punished more than 200 crimes 
with death.
16
 As utilitarian thinkers, they believed that punishment, albeit 
necessary, should ultimately serve the greater purpose of deterring future 
crime.
17
 Consequently, their ideal system was one that reduced reliance on 
torture and other severe penalties in favor of imprisonment.
18
 To balance 
the competing interests in punishing past crimes and deterring future 
crimes, the systems that evolved prioritized the norms of consistency, 
proportionality, and promptness.  
At its inception, the American prison system was a humanitarian revolt 
against draconian European traditions of criminal punishment.
19
 The norms 
championed by utilitarian thinkers led Pennsylvania to reform its criminal 
law and substitute sentences of imprisonment for corporal punishment.
20
 As 
the penitentiary came to play a more important role in holding convicts, the 
Pennsylvania system of prison discipline was born.
21
 Under the 
Pennsylvania system, prisoners convicted of serious crimes were held in 
solitary confinement and only permitted to interact with guards, or the 
                                                                                                             
 14. See Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 12. 
 15. See RACHEL O’CONNOR, THE UNITED STATES PRISON SYSTEM: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 15–16 (2014). 
 16. What Was the ‘Bloody Code’?, NAT’L JUSTICE MUSEUM, https://www.nationaljustice 
museum.org.uk/what-was-the-bloody-code/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2020); O’CONNOR, supra 
note 15, at 16. 
 17. See, e.g., CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., 
Macmillan 1986) (1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
(Prometheus Books 1988) (1789). 
 18. O’CONNOR, supra note 15, at 16. 
 19. See Harry Elmer Barnes, The Historical Origin of the Prison System in America, 12 
J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 35, 38 (1921). 
 20. Id. at 48 (citing 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682 TO 1801, 
at 280 (1906)). 
 21. See generally Pennsylvania System, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www. 
britannica.com/topic/Pennsylvania-system (last visited Apr. 22, 2020). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/6
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occasional visitor.
22
 The Pennsylvania system spread as far as Europe, but it 
was plagued by exorbitant costs and concerns for its effects on prisoners’ 
minds.
23
 
In response to the criticisms of the Pennsylvania system, the labor-based 
Auburn system evolved at Auburn Prison in New York.
24
 Under the Auburn 
system, prisoners worked during the day and lived in solitary confinement 
at night.
25
 Though this new system permitted prisoners greater human 
contact during their sentences, enforced silence still prevented them from 
communicating with one another.
26
 The Auburn system gradually replaced 
the Pennsylvania system in the United States and gave rise to correctional 
facilities that profit from prisoner labor.
27
 The Auburn system remained the 
dominant system in America until the Reconstruction and Progressive eras 
ushered in new reforms that sought to solve the problems of “overcrowding, 
corruption, and cruelty.”
28
 
As satisfaction with the Auburn system waned, the realities of the 
criminal justice system inhibited well-intentioned reform efforts.
29
 More 
criminals received long sentences in lieu of corporal punishment, and as a 
result, prisons became overcrowded.
30
 Because existing prisons endeavored 
to operate as efficiently as possible with limited funding, conditions 
continued to deteriorate.
31
 This decay led prison reformers to approach the 
task of creating a better criminal justice system by looking at societal 
problems through a scientific lens.
32
  
                                                                                                             
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Judith Anne Ryder, Auburn State Prison System, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Auburn-State-Prison (last visited Apr. 22, 2020). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Cf. id. (explaining that the labor-based Auburn system replaced the Pennsylvania 
system). 
 28. O’CONNOR, supra note 15, at 22–23 (quoting THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: 
THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman 
eds., 1998) (1995)). 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. at 22 (explaining that there was overcrowding following the widespread 
adoption of the Auburn system). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See The Prison Reform Movement, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia. 
com/social-sciences/news-wires-white-papers-and-books/prison-reform-movement (last 
updated May 3, 2020). 
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To highlight rampant inefficiencies and corruption, Enoch Wines and 
Theodore Dwight published the Report on the Prisons and Reformatories of 
the United States and Canada in 1867.
33
 The Wines and Dwight report, 
along with advances in the fields of medicine and psychiatry, led to 
innovations regarding probation, parole, and sentencing at the turn of the 
twentieth century.
34
 Probation emphasized society’s interest in 
rehabilitating criminals without sending them to jail and tore down the 
barriers prisoners faced when reintegrating into society as law-abiding 
citizens.
35
 Parole and sentencing changes—namely maximum sentences and 
indeterminate sentencing—also helped combat the problems associated 
with overcrowding by reducing the number of prisoners who continued to 
serve time after reforming their behavior.
36
 Together, these changes 
reinforced a preference for rehabilitation and marked a shift toward 
reintegration. However, they were far from perfect solutions. 
During the time when state governments assumed the cost of running 
prisons, these innovations transferred important functions of the criminal 
justice system back to city and local authorities.
37
 Though probation eased 
the financial burden on state prisons, its adoption shifted those costs to local 
governments.
38
 Poor funding at the local level prevented programs from 
operating with a sufficient number of probation officers.
39
 Furthermore, 
because judges primarily gave probation to young, middle-class offenders, 
poor inmates grew to comprise a greater proportion of the incarcerated 
population in state facilities.
40
  
Though state authorities implemented parole programs and indeterminate 
sentencing to reduce sentence lengths, systemic flaws prevented these 
promising reforms from fulfilling their intended goals. Parole boards, 
tasked with reviewing inmate cases, were composed of individuals who 
lacked the necessary expertise.
41
 These individuals’ lack of expertise, 
                                                                                                             
 33. See E. C. WINES & THEODORE W. DWIGHT, COMM’RS OF THE PRISON ASS’N OF N.Y., 
REPORT ON THE PRISONS AND REFORMATORIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (Albany, 
N.Y., Van Benthuysen & Sons 1867), https://archive.org/details/reportonprisonsr00corruoft. 
 34. The Prison Reform Movement, supra note 32. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.; O’CONNOR, supra note 15, at 22. 
 37. The Prison Reform Movement, supra note 32. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. (noting that members of parole boards had “little expertise in analyzing inmates’ 
prison records and psychological profiles”). 
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coupled with ever-growing caseloads, prevented them from dedicating 
adequate time to individual cases.
42
 Even once prisoners were released, the 
parole officers that supervised compliance with various conditions faced the 
same challenges.
43
 As a result, many prisoners served longer sentences 
under indeterminate sentencing than they would have under determinate 
sentencing.
44
 
Despite reform efforts throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, prison conditions failed to improve.
45
 Growing racial tensions 
spilled over into the prison environment and inflamed relations between 
inmates and guards.
46
 Many prisoners, influenced by civil rights protesters, 
demanded better treatment and living conditions in court.
47
 However, when 
legal victories proved ineffective, riots and strikes broke out all across the 
country.
48
 The turbulent 1960s and 1970s and rising recidivism rates led a 
majority of prison reformers to take the position that efforts to rehabilitate 
criminals were unsuccessful.
49
 Public outcry, in response to increased crime 
rates and prison violence, led policymakers to abandon rehabilitative 
aspirations and adopt policies that created the prison-industrial complex 
responsible for today’s incarceration crisis.
50
  
B. Factors Contributing to the Modern Incarceration Crisis 
1. Growing Public Tensions and Support for Retributive “Justice” 
Though the total crime rate more than doubled in the United States 
during the 1960s,
51
 levels of punishment remained relatively stable.
52
 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. (discussing overcrowding and riots during the mid-twentieth century). 
 46. Id. (recognizing that “relations between prisoners and guards and between black and 
white inmates grew increasingly tense”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (detailing general strikes and “dozens of riots” that broke out, including those at 
the San Quentin State Prison in 1967 and at the Attica Correctional Institution in 1971). 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. (explaining that the “tougher stance on crime that took shape” led to more 
imprisonments and many new facilities). 
 51. See United States Crime Rates 1960–2018, DISASTER CTR., http://www.disaster 
center.com/crime/uscrime.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2020) (compiling yearly population, 
crime number, and crime-rate data from the FBI UCS Annual Crime Reports). 
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Despite population growth of 12.3% over the period,
53
 incarceration rates 
fell more than 5%.
54
 The simultaneity of these trends led criminologist 
Jackson Toby to describe criminal punishment as “a vestigial carryover of a 
barbaric past” set to “disappear as humanitarianism and rationality 
spread.”
55
 Unfortunately, Toby’s research failed to grasp the extent to 
which the American public preferred punishment over rehabilitation. And 
heightened social and political unrest during the Civil Rights Movement 
and Vietnam War stoked the flames of discontent beyond recognition.
56
 
The Civil Rights Movement—often called the Second 
Reconstruction
57
—led to the realization of equal rights for black Americans 
under the law.
58
 While the nearly two-decade battle for equality brought an 
end to segregation,
59
 voter suppression,
60
 employment discrimination,
61
 and 
housing discrimination
62
 on the basis of race, it ultimately failed to remedy 
the disproportionate incarceration of black Americans.
63
 As implementation 
                                                                                                             
 52. See Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, A Theory of the Stability of Punishment, 
64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 199 (1973) (“[I]t is not the level of actual criminal 
behavior which is stable, but rather the level of punished criminal acts.”).  
 53. See United States Crime Rates 1960–2018, supra note 51. 
 54. See PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON 
PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, YEAREND 1925–86, at 10–11 (1988) 
(indicating that the incarcerated population fell from 208,105 total state and federal inmates 
on December 31, 1959 to 197,136 total inmates on December 31, 1969). When accounting 
for population growth over the period, per-capita incarceration rates fell by more than 15%. 
See id.; United States Crime Rates 1960–2018, supra note 51. 
 55. Jackson Toby, Is Punishment Necessary, 55 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 
332, 332 (1964). 
 56. See infra notes 57–71 and accompanying text. 
 57. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955). 
 58. Civil Rights Movement, HISTORY (Oct. 27, 2009), https://www.history.com/topics/ 
black-history/civil-rights-movement. 
 59. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 60. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 52 U.S.C.).  
 61. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).  
 62. See Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619). 
 63. See Bruce Drake, Incarceration Gap Widens Between Whites and Blacks, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/06/incarceration-gap-
between-whites-and-blacks-widens/. In 1960, black Americans were five times more likely 
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of equal protection laws increased competition for jobs and housing, a 
phenomenon commonly referred to as “white backlash”
64
 took hold.
65
 Amid 
rising crime rates and growing racial tensions, many Americans demanded 
that the federal government take affirmative steps to punish lawbreakers.
66
  
At the same time, U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War spurred protests 
against the government.
67
 Though opposition to the Vietnam War began on 
college campuses, especially among hippies and intellectuals,
68
 support for 
anti-war marches and protests grew alongside burgeoning casualty counts 
and war expenditures.
69
 Once Northern Vietnamese troops launched the Tet 
Offensive
70
 and successfully defended against U.S. and South Vietnamese 
troops, the impracticality of continued U.S. involvement turned the majority 
of the American public against the war.
71
 Alongside rising crime rates and 
growing racial tensions, anti-war protests created a social and political 
environment that facilitated the federal government’s efforts to stifle dissent 
by cracking down on crime. 
2. The Wars on Poverty, Drugs, and Crime 
In response to the growing social and political tensions that plagued the 
1960s, the federal government took a more active role in crafting, 
implementing, and enforcing criminal justice policy.
72
 In 1964, President 
Lyndon B. Johnson launched the Great Society, a series of domestic 
                                                                                                             
to be incarcerated than white Americans; by 2010, that number rose to more than six times. 
Id. 
 64. See White Backlash, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/white%20backlash (last visited Apr. 9, 2020) (defining white backlash as “the 
hostile reaction of white Americans to the advances of the civil rights movement”).  
 65. See generally Eoin Higgins, The White Backlash to the Civil Rights Movement, 
EOINHIGGINS.COM (May 22, 2014), https://eoinhiggins.com/the-white-backlash-to-the-civil-
rights-movement-1817ff0a9fc (reviewing literature that describes the underlying social, 
economic, and political forces influencing white backlash). 
 66. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 105 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western, & Steve 
Redburn eds., 2014). 
 67. Vietnam War Protests, HISTORY (Feb. 22, 2010), https://www.history.com/topics/ 
vietnam-war/vietnam-war-protests. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See generally Tet Offensive, HISTORY (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.history.com/ 
topics/vietnam-war/tet-offensive. 
 71. See Vietnam War Protests, supra note 67. 
 72. See infra notes 73–94 and accompanying text. 
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programs, in response to the growing incidence of poverty and racial 
injustice.
73
 The so-called War on Poverty was the most ambitious and 
controversial part of Johnson’s plan
74
 and included legislation that brought 
anti-poverty programs to impoverished communities.
75
 Along with anti-
poverty measures that attempted to alleviate poverty through job programs 
and food stamps, the Great Society led to the passage of the Social Security 
Act of 1965 and the resulting expansion of medical care and welfare for the 
elderly and poor.
76
 However, the rhetoric surrounding the 1964 presidential 
election shifted the national conversation from empowering marginalized 
demographics to punishing lawlessness.
77
 
After defeating Barry “crime in the streets”
78
 Goldwater in the 1964 
presidential election,
79
 President Johnson pivoted, declaring a War on 
Crime.
80
 President Johnson established the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice in July 1965 to evaluate the 
impact of crime on society, to improve law enforcement, corrections, and 
judicial methods, and to publish a report containing findings and 
recommendations.
81
 The resulting report, “The Challenge of Crime in a 
Free Society,” contained more than 200 recommendations,
82
 including a 
                                                                                                             
 73. See generally Great Society, HISTORY (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.history.com/ 
topics/1960s/great-society. 
 74. See Here & Now: ‘War on Poverty’ Remains Controversial (NPR radio broadcast 
Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2014/01/08/war-on-poverty. 
 75. See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
525, 78 Stat. 703 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036c). 
 76. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified 
as amended primarily in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 77. See generally Charles Mohr, Goldwater Links the Welfare State to Rise in Crime, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 1964), https://www.nytimes.com/1964/09/11/archives/goldwater-
links-the-welfare-state-to-rise-in-crime.html. 
 78. See Steve Hoenisch, Crime Policy of the Republican Party, CRITICISM.COM (July 28, 
2004), http://www.criticism.com/policy/republicans-crime-policy.php. 
 79. Michael Levy, United States Presidential Election of 1964, ENCYCLOPÆDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/United-States-presidential-election-of-1964 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2020). 
 80. See Elizabeth Hinton, Why We Should Reconsider the War on Crime, TIME (Mar. 
20, 2015, 7:00 AM EDT), http://time.com/3746059/war-on-crime-history/. 
 81. The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice: 
Organization and Goals, 4 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 118, 118–19 (1966). 
 82. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF 
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 293–301 (1967). 
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national strategy for controlling crime that led to an increase in funding and 
training for police departments, prosecutors, and correctional systems.
83
 
The report, and its resulting expansion of the criminal justice system, 
created a springboard from which President Richard Nixon’s War on 
Drugs—a war that many commentators today believe America is losing, or 
has already lost
84
—could flourish. Nixon’s portrayal of drug addicts and 
criminals as deserving of social condemnation predated his election in 
1968.
85
 But his efforts to tie drug addiction to crime proved unsuccessful 
until the simultaneous rise in recreational drug use and crime during the 
1960s convinced the American public that drugs were responsible for the 
problem.
86
  
Nixon officially declared a war on drugs in June 1971, “stating that drug 
abuse was ‘public enemy number one.’”
87
 As a result, he increased federal 
funding for drug-control agencies, proposed mandatory sentences for drug 
crimes, and created new offices and agencies tasked with preventing drug 
abuse.
88
 Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Administration in 1973 to 
“enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United 
                                                                                                             
 83. See id. at 279. 
 84. See, e.g., José R. Cárdenas, The United States Is Losing the War on Drugs in the 
Americas, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 18, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/18/ 
the-united-states-is-losing-the-war-on-drugs-in-the-americas/; Misha Glenny, The War on 
Drugs Has Been Lost, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c9719098-
964d-11e8-95f8-8640db9060a7; Ben Wallace-Wells, How America Lost the War on Drugs, 
ROLLING STONE (Mar. 24, 2011, 6:44 PM ET), https://www.rollingstone.com/ 
politics/politics-news/how-america-lost-the-war-on-drugs-170965/; The War on Drugs Is 
Lost, NAT’L REV. (July 28, 2014, 3:07 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2014/07/war-
drugs-lost-nro-staff/. 
 85. See Richard Nixon, What Has Happened to America?, READER’S DIGEST, Oct. 1967, 
at 49, 49–50 (“[T]here is the indulgence of crime because of sympathy for the past 
grievances of those who have become criminals. . . . Our opinion-makers have gone too far 
in promoting the doctrine that when a law is broken, society, not the criminal is to blame.”); 
see also United States Presidential Election of 1968, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/United-States-presidential-election-of-1968 (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2020). 
 86. See Jennifer Robison, Decades of Drug Use: Data from the ‘60s and ‘70s, GALLUP 
(July 2, 2002), https://news.gallup.com/poll/6331/decades-drug-use-data-from-60s-70s.aspx 
(“[I]n 1969, 48% of Americans told Gallup that drug use was a serious problem in their 
community.”). 
 87. War on Drugs, HISTORY (May 31, 2017), https://www.history.com/topics/crime/the-
war-on-drugs. 
 88. Id. (referencing the creation of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention 
and the Drug Enforcement Administration). 
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States,”
89
 but revelations made by Watergate co-conspirator John 
Ehrlichman in a 1994 interview suggest a more nefarious intent.
90
 
Regardless of Nixon’s rationale for waging his war on drugs, the result has 
been a catastrophic increase in incarceration that stimulated the criminal 
justice system’s reliance on new facilities for housing inmates.
91
 
The War on Drugs and other “Tough on Crime” laws passed in the 1970s 
and 1980s placed an immense strain on the criminal justice system as state 
and federal authorities scrambled to address the crisis of unprecedented 
overcrowding.
92
 Chief among these “Tough on Crime” laws were 
mandatory minimum sentencing, truth in sentencing, and three-strikes 
laws.
93
 Together, these laws limited judges’ discretion to impose alternative 
forms of punishment, required inmates to remain incarcerated even after 
being rehabilitated, and inflicted extreme sentences for repeat offenders.
94
 
Fortunately for policymakers—but unfortunately for society—the market 
                                                                                                             
 89. History, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/history (last visited May 
21, 2020). 
 90. See Dan Baum, Legalize It All: How to Win the War on Drugs, HARPER’S MAG., 
Apr. 2016, at 22, 22. When asked about the politics of drug prohibition, Ehrlichman 
responded: 
You want to know what this was really all about? . . . The Nixon campaign in 
1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left 
and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We knew we couldn’t 
make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to 
associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then 
criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could 
arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them 
night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the 
drugs? Of course we did. 
Id. (quoting John Ehrlichman). 
 91. See Kathleen Miles, Just How Much the War on Drugs Impacts Our Overcrowded 
Prisons, in One Chart, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2014, 7:30 AM ET), https://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/10/war-on-drugs-prisons-infographic_n_4914884.html 
(showing that drug offenses accounted for 50.1% of federal inmates in 2014). But see 
German Lopez, Why You Can’t Blame Mass Incarceration on the War on Drugs, VOX (May 
30, 2017, 9:00 AM EDT), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/30/15591700/ 
mass-incarceration-john-pfaff-locked-in (discussing a new book by John Pfaff that suggests 
the war on drugs’ influence on incarceration rates is overstated).  
 92. See supra Part I. 
 93. DAVID SHAPIRO, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE 
PRISONS AND MASS INCARCERATION 10–11 (2011). 
 94. Id. 
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offered a promising “solution” to the growing problem of overcrowded 
prisons.
95
 
3. Private Prisons and the Prison-Industrial Complex 
Though private prisons house less than 10% of state and federal 
inmates,
96
 their continued existence imbues concerns about the future of 
mass incarceration.
97
 When the Obama Administration’s Department of 
Justice decided to phase out private prisons for federal inmates,
98
 stock 
prices for the two largest private prison companies in the U.S.—Corrections 
Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group—fell more than 35%.
99
 
Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates’ criticism of private facilities’ 
inadequate program offerings, high costs, and inferior safety and security
100
 
proved to be such a scathing rebuke that CCA had to change its name to 
CoreCivic to distance itself from its public reputation.
101
 Despite these 
                                                                                                             
 95. See infra notes 96–110 and accompanying text. 
 96. Peter Wagner, Are Private Prisons Driving Mass Incarceration?, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/10/07/private_prisons_ 
parasite/. 
 97. See Carl Takei, Private Prison Giant CoreCivic’s Wants to Corner the Mass 
Incarceration ‘Market’ in the States, ACLU (Nov. 7, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/ 
blog/smart-justice/mass-incarceration/private-prison-giant-corecivics-wants-corner-mass. 
 98. Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Reducing Our Use of Private Prisons (Aug. 18, 2016). But see Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Rescission of Memorandum on Use of Private Prisons (Feb. 21, 
2017) (rescinding the August 18, 2016 memo). 
 99. Christopher Ingraham, Private Prison Stocks Collapse After Justice Department 
Promises to Phase Them Out, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2016, 12:48 PM CDT), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/18/private-prison-stocks-collapse-after-justice-
department-promises-to-phase-them-out/?utm_term=.f227cd7dab72. 
 100. Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, supra note 98. 
 101. See Carl Takei, CoreCivic’s Practices Unchanged Despite Dropping CCA Name, 
TENNESSEAN (Dec. 12, 2016, 3:52 PM CT), https://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/ 
2016/12/12/corecivics-practices-unchanged-despite-dropping-cca-name/93907514/ 
[hereinafter Takei, CoreCivic].  
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developments, Donald Trump’s presidency
102
 and industry lobbying 
efforts
103
 have since given the private prison industry new life.  
An understanding of how the industry’s continued existence threatens to 
perpetuate mass incarceration in America requires some study of its 
resurgence in the 1980s.
104
 The private prison industry as we know it today 
began in 1984, when CoreCivic (then called the Corrections Corporation of 
America
105
) opened its first private, for-profit facility in Shelby County, 
Tennessee.
106
 By 1990, sixty-six more private facilities opened.
107
 These 
facilities capitalized on the burgeoning prison population that outpaced 
state and federal facilities’ capacity to hold inmates,
108
 and the private 
prison population grew from approximately 8,000 inmates to 129,000 over 
the next twenty years.
109
 Unprecedented increases in incarceration rates 
made this more than 1500% growth in the private prison inmate population 
                                                                                                             
 102. See Jeff Sommer, Trump’s Win Gives Stocks in Private Prison Companies a 
Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/your-money/ 
trumps-win-gives-stocks-in-private-prison-companies-a-reprieve.html; Jeff Sommer, Trump 
Immigration Crackdown Is Great for Private Prison Stocks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/your-money/immigrants-prison-stocks.html. 
 103. See, e.g., Statement on CoreCivic’s Inducement to the State of Montana, ACLU OF 
MONT. (Oct. 31, 2017, 4:45 PM), https://www.aclumontana.org/en/news/statement-
corecivics-inducement-state-montana. 
 104. Though the first modern private prison opened in 1984, it was not the first of its 
kind in America. See Shane Bauer, The True History of America’s Private Prison Industry, 
TIME (Sept. 25, 2018), http://time.com/5405158/the-true-history-of-americas-private-prison-
industry/ (discussing private prisons from the mid-1800s to the early 1900s). 
 105. In 2016, President Obama’s Department of Justice decided to phase out private 
prisons for federal inmates. Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, supra note 98. But see 
Sessions, supra note 98 (rescinding this memo). The Administration’s 2016 memo criticized 
private facilities so badly that the Corrections Corporation of America changed its name to 
CoreCivic to distance itself from its soiled public reputation. See Takei, CoreCivic, supra 
note 101.  
 106. The CCA Story: Our Company History, CCA, http://www.correctionscorp.com/our-
history (last visited May 21, 2020). 
 107. SHAPIRO, supra note 93, at 11. 
 108. Tara Joy, The Problem with Private Prisons, JUSTICE POL’Y INST. (Feb. 2, 2018), 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/news/12006. 
 109. JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS 
OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1995, at iv (1997); HEATHER C. WEST ET 
AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009, at 33 app. 
tbl.19 (rev. 2011). 
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possible as state governments struggled to combat the consequences of 
federal involvement in criminal punishment.
110
 
As reliance on private prisons grew, so too did the potential for increased 
profits through lobbying efforts.
111
 Though the influence of the private 
prison lobby varies from state to state, the industry has played a central role 
in lobbying for mandatory-minimum sentencing, truth in sentencing, and 
three-strike laws at the federal level.
112
 Alarmingly, the three biggest private 
prison companies spent a combined $22 million lobbying Congress 
between 2001 and 2011.
113
 As state inmate populations continue to grow, 
the risk of private prison lobbying poses problems on a different front—
state contracts with minimum occupancy clauses.
114
 
Today, twenty-eight states, including Oklahoma, still rely on private 
prisons.
115
 While private facilities do ease the burden on overcrowded state 
facilities,
116
 continued spending on housing inmates diverts funds that could 
be allocated to reform efforts. Furthermore, minimum occupancy 
agreements frequently require states to maintain anywhere from 70% to 
100% occupancy at private facilities.
117
 This mandate means that every new 
contract—even if intended as a short-term solution to a temporary increase 
in inmates—constitutes a commitment to incarcerating more individuals in 
that facility over the life of the agreement. When state governments are 
obligated to incarcerate a minimum number of individuals, they have a 
perverse incentive to ignore legitimate justifications for criminal 
                                                                                                             
 110. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
 111. See PICO NAT’L NETWORK & PUBLIC CAMPAIGN, UNHOLY ALLIANCE: HOW THE 
PRIVATE PRISON INDUSTRY IS CORRUPTING OUR DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTING MASS 
INCARCERATION 3 (2011).  
 112. Id. at 4.  
 113. Id. at 3. 
 114. See generally Joe Watson, Report Finds Two-Thirds of Private Prison Contracts 
Include “Lockup Quotas”, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (July 31, 2015), https://www.prisonlegal 
news.org/news/2015/jul/31/report-finds-two-thirds-private-prison-contracts-include-lockup-
quotas/. 
 115. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 tbl.1 (2019). 
In 2017, Oklahoma housed 7353 inmates in private facilities, representing more than 26% of 
its incarcerated population. Id. This statistic suggests that Oklahoma is a state where private 
prison contracts still pose a substantial risk to efforts to reduce the incarcerated population. 
 116. See Ryan Gentzler, Private Prisons Are Bad Policy, but They’re Not to Blame for 
Oklahoma’s Incarceration Problem, OKLA. POL’Y INST.: OK POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 12, 2018), 
https://okpolicy.org/private-prisons-are-bad-policy-but-theyre-not-to-blame-for-oklahomas-
incarceration-problem/. 
 117. Watson, supra note 114. 
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punishment and fill empty beds at all costs. This dynamic has led states to 
modify their bail practices in a way that categorizes criminal defendants 
according to their wealth, which has become the single greatest factor in 
determining whether they will be released pending trial. Despite concerns 
surrounding continued reliance on private prisons, the risks that these 
facilities pose to the incarceration crisis pale in comparison to the 
detrimental effects of changing bail practices. 
4. Changing Pretrial Policies and the Warehouse Effect 
As sociopolitical tensions brewed, federal involvement in criminal 
punishment became more pervasive, and private prisons injected 
themselves into both federal and state criminal justice systems, the most 
troubling factor underlying the modern incarceration crisis took the form of 
mutating bail practices.
118
 After arrest and booking, a criminal defendant 
typically sits in jail until a judge conducts a bail hearing.
119
 At these 
hearings, the judge considers whether the accused is eligible for bail and, if 
so, what costs or conditions should accompany bail.
120
 Judges enjoy broad 
discretion in setting bail amounts and conditions and may consider an array 
of factors.
121
 While the majority of defendants were historically released 
pretrial, today, approximately 60% of defendants remain detained because 
they do not receive bail or are unable to afford the amount.
122
 This troubling 
statistic contradicts the fundamental principle that defendants should be 
released unless they pose a flight risk or danger to the community.
123
 
While the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, there is no 
Constitutional right to bail.
124
 The Bail Reform Act of 1966 created a 
statutory right to pretrial release unless a particular defendant posed a flight 
                                                                                                             
 118. See Peter Wagner, Jails Matter. But Who Is Listening?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 
(Aug. 14, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/08/14/jailsmatter/ [hereinafter 
Wagner, Jails Matter]. 
 119. See RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT 
DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 29 (2015).  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Cf. TODD D. MINTON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2013 - STATISTICAL TABLES, 7 tbl.3 (2014) 
(noting that over 60% of inmates in local jails are unconvicted).  
 123. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 119.  
 124. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754–55 (1987). 
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risk.
125
 This statutory guarantee required federal judges presiding over bail 
hearings to release criminal defendants without financial considerations 
unless detention was necessary to prevent flight.
126
 The Bail Reform Act of 
1984 supplemented this framework by allowing judges to consider whether 
a defendant “endanger[s] the safety of any other person or the 
community”
127
 in addition to flight. Thus, the presumption that a defendant 
should be released unless he poses a flight risk or danger was born. 
However, while the Bail Reform Act of 1984 remains in effect today, 
courts now impose a third condition on a pretrial release: the defendant’s 
financial resources.
128
 This third rationale is particularly insidious when it 
fails to even consider the defendant’s ability to pay. Moreover, many 
jurisdictions across the country use bail schedules and assign predetermined 
bail amounts based on the charged offense.
129
 Though bail schedules have 
recently come under fire on procedural due process grounds,
130
 counties in 
Oklahoma still employ them.
131
 As a result of these practices, jails across 
the country effectively serve as debtor’s prisons.
132
 
                                                                                                             
 125. See Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 2, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (“The 
purpose of this Act is to revise the practices relating to bail to assure that all persons, 
regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their appearance 
to answer charges . . . when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public 
interest.”). A defendant poses a flight risk when she is likely to flee the jurisdiction to avoid 
criminal prosecution. The primary factors that decrease a defendant’s flight risk include 
community ties through family or work. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 30. 
 126. See Bail Reform Act of 1966 sec. 3, § 3146(a), 80 Stat. at 214. Pretrial release 
without financial conditions is commonly referred to as a personal recognizance (PR) bond. 
Personal Recognizance Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal. 
com/p/personal-recognizance/ (last visited May 20, 2020). When a defendant is released on a 
PR bond, he promises to return to court for future proceedings. Id. 
 127. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1) (2018). 
 128. See Pinto, supra note 3. 
 129. See, e.g., Elizabeth Marcellino, LA County Seeks Best Models for Bail Reform, NBC 
4: L.A. (Feb. 6, 2019, 2:15 AM), https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/LA-County-
Bail-Reform-505405321.html; Nick Powell, Lead Plaintiff in Galveston County Bail 
Lawsuit Wants Fairer Process for Defendants, CHRON (Jan. 23, 2019, 2:56 PM CST), 
https://www.chron.com/local/article/Lead-plaintiff-testifies-in-federal-lawsuit-1355 
5669.php. 
 130. See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1265 (11th Cir. 2018); ODonnell v. 
Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 157 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 131. See, e.g., Administrative Order: Amended Preset Bond Schedule, No. AO-2015-16 
(Tulsa Cty. Dist. Ct., Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.oklahomacriminallaw.com/Tulsa_ 
County_Bond_Schedule.pdf. The ACLU of Oklahoma is currently challenging the use of 
bail schedules in Canadian County. See Civil Rights Groups File Federal Lawsuit 
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Recent statistics confirm that discriminatory bail practices 
disproportionately burden indigent defendants.
133
 Disturbingly, jail growth 
has continued to rise over the past twenty years despite the convicted 
population shrinking.
134
 And research shows that 99% of jail growth 
between 1999 and 2014 stemmed from an increase in the number of pretrial 
detainees.
135
 This finding is especially problematic when pretrial detention 
increases the likelihood that a criminal defendant will plead guilty, be 
convicted, receive a sentence of imprisonment, and receive a longer 
sentence.
136
 Because pretrial detention poses such deleterious risks to 
criminal defendants,
137
 reforms that seek to address the incarceration crisis 
must focus on reducing the likelihood that an indigent defendant will 
receive a bail amount that she cannot afford to pay. 
II. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and its Many Variants 
The practices discussed above disproportionately affect poor defendants 
and perpetuate a system that traps them in a cycle of poverty-induced 
incarceration.
138
 And while the Supreme Court has helped in one important 
way—by incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
139
 in 
1963
140
—the fact that this right does not assure indigent defendants 
representation at bail hearings inhibits its efficacy.
141
 Despite this 
                                                                                                             
Challenging Unjust Cash Bail System in Canadian County, OK, ACLU OF OKLA. (Dec. 11, 
2019), https://www.acluok.org/en/press-releases/civil-rights-groups-file-federal-lawsuit-
challenging-unjust-cash-bail-system-canadian. 
 132. Wagner, Jails Matter, supra note 118. 
 133. See Pinto, supra note 3. 
 134. See Wagner, Jails Matter, supra note 118. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id.; see MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., A DECADE OF 
BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 115 (2012). 
 137. Research shows that pretrial detention as short as three days can impact an 
individual’s employment, finances, and housing as well as the wellbeing of dependent 
children. Joshua Aiken, Era of Mass Expansion: Why State Officials Should Fight Jail 
Growth, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 31, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/ 
jailsovertime.html#jailconvictionstatus (citing studies from the Crime and Justice Institute). 
 138. See id. 
 139. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); see infra Section II.A. 
 140. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 141. See infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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shortcoming, states follow three methods—each inadequate in their own 
way—for assuring the right to counsel.
142
  
A. Incorporation Against the States 
Gideon v. Wainwright was the landmark case that first guaranteed a 
defendant in a state prosecution the right to counsel.
143
 In Gideon, the 
Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
144
 While this 
monumental decision fundamentally changed the nature of criminal 
proceedings for indigent defendants in state prosecutions, it only guaranteed 
the right to counsel in felony cases.
145
 Despite the narrowness of this initial 
guarantee, the Court eventually extended the right to counsel to other 
categories of state proceedings.
146
 
The right to counsel now applies at state juvenile delinquency 
proceedings that may result in commitment to an institution,
147
 for 
misdemeanors that result in actual imprisonment,
148
 during a first appeal,
149
 
and at all critical stages of the prosecution.
150
 The right to counsel also 
includes the right to decide whether to have counsel
151
 because defendants 
have the right to represent themselves as long as they make the decision 
knowingly and voluntarily.
152
 It similarly includes the right to effective 
counsel.
153
 Free representation need not be perfect, but it must be 
substantially equivalent to that which would be provided by a privately 
retained or appointed attorney.
154
 Ineffective assistance of counsel can be 
grounds for reversal of a criminal conviction when the defendant proves 
                                                                                                             
 142. See infra Section II.B. 
 143. See 372 U.S. 335, 339, 344 (1963). 
 144. See id. at 339. 
 145. See id. (concluding that the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated to apply against the 
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects the right of an 
individual convicted of a felony to have counsel appointed to assist him). 
 146. See infra notes 147–50.  
 147. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by Allen v. 
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372 (1986). 
 148. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 
373 (1979). 
 149. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963). 
 150. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). 
 151. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833–35 (1975). 
 152. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1938). 
 153. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
 154. See McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisc., Dist. 1, 486 U.S 429, 435, 438 (1988). 
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that the representation was objectively unreasonable and actually affected 
the outcome.
155
  
Despite the broad application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in 
state prosecutions, the safeguard does not protect indigent defendants at 
what may be the most important stage for innocent persons: the initial bail 
hearing.
156
 Although the Supreme Court mandates that states provide 
indigent defendants free representation at various stages of a criminal 
prosecution, state legislatures enjoy broad discretion in determining the 
methods through which they ensure the right to counsel within their 
jurisdictions. 
B. Methods for Ensuring the Right to Counsel 
There are three main models for ensuring the right to counsel for 
indigent defendants: assigned counsel, contract systems, and public 
defender programs.
157
 Under the assigned counsel model, courts assign 
private attorneys to cases on an ad hoc or systematic basis.
158
 Under the 
contract model, private attorneys, groups of attorneys, bar associations, or 
nonprofit organizations agree to represent some or all of the indigent 
defendants in a given jurisdiction for a specified period.
159
 Under the public 
defender model, public or private nonprofit organizations employ staff 
attorneys and support staff to manage the indigent defense cases within a 
given jurisdiction on an ongoing basis.
160
 Although none of these methods 
guarantee indigent defendants representation at the initial appearance, their 
relative benefits and shortcomings help elucidate opportunities for 
legislative and judicial reform. 
  
                                                                                                             
 155. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–92 (1984). 
 156. See PRETRIAL JUSTICE CTR. FOR COURTS, PRETRIAL JUSTICE BRIEF NO. 7, ACCESS TO 
COUNSEL AT PRETRIAL RELEASE PROCEEDINGS 1 (2016) (explaining that the Supreme Court 
“left open whether a proceeding at which the decision is made to release or detain a 
defendant pending trial qualifies as one of these critical stages at which counsel must be 
present”).  
 157. Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the 
United States, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 32 (1995). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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1. Assigned Counsel 
The ad hoc assigned counsel model is the oldest form of providing 
indigent defendants with the right to counsel.
161
 Under this model, courts 
appoint attorneys without regard for a set rotation or list of qualification 
criteria.
162
 For example, if an indigent defendant appears at a pretrial 
proceeding, the judge might look out into the courtroom, call an attorney to 
the bench, and assign the case to that attorney. Attorneys assigned in similar 
manners are usually paid an hourly rate, but they may receive a flat fee per 
case.
163
 This is among the most commonly employed methods across the 
country, especially in small, less-populated counties.
164
 
The coordinated assigned counsel model is similar to the ad hoc model, 
except that these types of programs operate under the direction of an 
administrative or oversight body.
165
 These programs typically require 
minimum qualifications before attorneys may participate, and cases are 
assigned on a rotational basis according to the attorney’s area of expertise 
and case complexity.
166
 Compensation structures are similar to those 
employed under the ad hoc model, but this system helps ensure counsel’s 
independence from the judiciary and higher standards of representation.
167
 
2. Contract Systems 
The first type of contract system is the fixed-price contract system 
whereby attorneys, groups of attorneys, bar associations, or nonprofit 
organizations accept undetermined numbers of cases for a flat fee.
168
 
Contracting attorneys are generally responsible for all costs related to 
investigation and securing expert witnesses.
169
 While contract prices are 
based on an estimated caseload, if the number of cases exceeds the 
projected amount, the contracting attorney, or group of attorneys, is 
responsible for providing representation without additional 
compensation.
170
 
                                                                                                             
 161. Id. at 33. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  
 165. See id.  
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. at 33–34. 
 168. Id. at 34. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. 
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The ABA has condemned the use of fixed-price contracts for providing 
indigent defense services,
171
 and the Arizona Supreme Court has even 
declared them unconstitutional.
172
 The Arizona Supreme Court cited the 
following reasons for prohibiting use of fixed-price contracts: (1) failure to 
take into account the time that attorneys spend representing indigent 
defendants, (2) failure to provide support costs for contracting attorneys, (3) 
failure to “take into account the competency of the attorney” providing 
indigent defense services, and (4) failure to “take into account the 
complexity of each case.”
173
 In September 2006, the Washington Supreme 
Court prohibited fixed-price contracts that require attorneys to bear the cost 
of investigation or securing expert witnesses, because they “involve an 
inherent conflict between the interests of the client and the personal 
interests of the lawyer.”
174
 This decision came after the ACLU of 
Washington brought a class-action lawsuit on behalf of indigent defendants 
represented by Grant County’s contracted public defense attorneys.
175
 
The fixed-fee-per-case contract is a less common version of the contract 
method whereby attorneys, groups of attorneys, bar associations, or 
nonprofit organizations agree to represent indigent defendants in “a 
predetermined number of cases for a fixed fee per case.”
176
 This system is 
far less common than the fixed-price contract system, mostly because the 
associated costs are higher.
177
 However, where the fixed-fee-per-case 
system has been implemented, it has led to higher-quality representation.
178
 
ABA Standards favor these systems over fixed-price systems and require 
contracts to include, among other items, the following pieces of 
information: (1) type and number of cases, (2) fee per case, (3) attorney 
qualification standards, and (4) names of attorneys who will be working on 
the cases.
179
  
                                                                                                             
 171. Id. 
 172. Arizona v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc). 
 173. Id.  
 174. See WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 27 (2015).  
 175. See Settlement Revamps Grant County, Washington Indigent Defense System; 
County Agrees to $1.1 Million in Attorney Fees, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Jan. 15, 2007), 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2007/jan/15/settlement-revamps-grant-county-
washington-indigent-defense-system-county-agrees-to-11-million-in-attorney-fees/. 
 176. Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 157, at 34. 
 177. See id. at 35. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE 
SERVICES 13, 49–50 (3d. ed. 1992). 
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3. Public Defender Programs 
The final method for ensuring the right to counsel at the state level 
involves a public defender program, which “is a public or private nonprofit 
organization staffed by full- or part-time attorneys” who represent all 
indigent criminal defendants within a given jurisdiction.
180
 While programs 
vary, the common characteristic underlying all public defender systems is 
the employment of staff attorneys.
181
 The public defender concept existed in 
the early 1900s but became increasingly popular in the aftermath of Gideon 
v. Wainwright.
182
 And by 2013, public defender systems closed at least 60% 
of cases handled by state indigent defense systems.
183
 
Public defender systems are popular in larger jurisdictions that can afford 
to pay staff attorneys and professional staff, but operational costs tend to 
rise over time as caseloads expand.
184
 The result is that public defenders, 
like those working within the fixed-price contract system, often carry heavy 
caseloads that complicate the task of providing effective representation to 
all clients who require indigent defense services.
185
 Because conflicts of 
interest often arise when one organization defends all indigent criminal 
defendants within a particular geographic area, these systems often operate 
alongside an assigned counsel or contract system.
186
 
III. Oklahoma’s Indigent Defense Framework 
A. The Two-Pronged Approach 
Like the U.S. Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution guarantees 
criminal defendants the right to counsel.
187
 Since 1978, Oklahoma law has 
permitted city governments with populations of 200,000 or more to create 
an office of public defender to protect the rights of any defendant charged 
                                                                                                             
 180. Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 157, at 36. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See SUZANNE M. STRONG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
STATE-ADMINISTERED INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 2013, at 3 tbl.1 (rev. 2017) (showing 
that, in 2013, public defenders closed roughly 1.65 million out of 2.70 million indigent 
defense cases in twenty-eight states plus the District of Columbia). 
 184. See Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 157, at 36. 
 185. Id. at 36–37. 
 186. Id. at 36. 
 187. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20. 
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with violating any ordinance, upon the order of any criminal judge.
188
 As of 
1995, counties with populations of at least 300,000 automatically have an 
office of public defender to “protect[] . . . the rights of any defendant to a 
criminal action.”
189
 For cities and counties with insufficient populations, 
indigent defense work is provided under the Indigent Defense Act.
190
 
1. Public Defender 
Only two counties satisfy the population requirements under titles 11 and 
19 to establish an office of public defender: Oklahoma County and Tulsa 
County.
191
 The Oklahoma County Public Defender and Tulsa County 
Public Defender offices provide the following categories of representation 
for indigent defendants: misdemeanors, felonies, capital crimes, juvenile 
defense, domestic, civil commitment, and child advocacy—including trial 
and appellate work.
192
 Manned with attorneys, investigators, and 
professional support personnel, county public defender offices provide 
representation to criminal defendants who are too poor to hire a private 
attorney.
193
 
Defendants who request representation by a public defender must, under 
oath and penalty of perjury, apply and pay a nonrefundable $15 application 
fee.
194
 A court will not accept an application that is not accompanied by the 
fee, unless the court decides to waive the fee after determining that the 
applicant is in custody or lacks the financial resources to pay.
195
 If the 
defendant requests representation after being released on bond, the 
application must include a statement certifying that the applicant has 
contacted three licensed attorneys and has been unable to obtain private 
counsel.
196
 The court sends a copy of each application to the prosecuting 
attorney for review and will, upon request, require a hearing before 
declaring a defendant indigent and thus eligible for appointment of a public 
                                                                                                             
 188. 11 OKLA. STAT. § 28-110 (2011). 
 189. 19 OKLA. STAT. § 138.1a(A) (2011). 
 190. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355(C) (2011). 
 191. See POPULATION DIV., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT 
POPULATION: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2018 (2018).  
 192. Public Defender, OKLA. CTY., https://www.oklahomacounty.org/169/Public-
Defender (last visited May 21, 2020); What We Do, TULSA CTY. PUB. DEFS., http://tulsa 
publicdefender.net/tulsa-county-public-defender/ (last visited May 21, 2020). 
 193. See 19 OKLA. STAT. § 138.5(A) (2011 & Supp. 2019). 
 194. Id. § 138.5(B). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
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defender.
197
 If a defendant has posted bond, other than by recognizance, the 
court may consider that fact in determining eligibility for appointed 
counsel, as long as such payment of bond is not the sole factor in 
determining whether an applicant is indigent.
198
  
2. Oklahoma Indigent Defense System 
Following the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Oklahoma v. 
Lynch,
199
 the Oklahoma Legislature passed the Indigent Defense Act (the 
Act) to expand indigent criminal defendants’ access to counsel.
200
 The Act 
created the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System (OIDS)
201
 and the 
Oklahoma Indigent Defense System Board (the Board).
202
 Under the Act, 
the Board is tasked with governing OIDS.
203
 The Act also established the 
process for determining whether a defendant is indigent
204
 and identified 
the scope of proceedings for which indigents receive representation.
205
 
The application process for representation under OIDS is similar to that 
for representation by a county public defender
206
 but is governed by rules 
promulgated by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
207
 Like individuals applying 
for representation by a county public defender, individuals applying under 
the Act must disclose information pertaining to financial status, the 
possibility of family assistance, and bond status under oath and penalty of 
perjury.
208
 Like individuals who have posted bond before applying for 
representation by a public defender, OIDS applicants must include a written 
statement certifying that they have contacted three licensed attorneys and 
                                                                                                             
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. § 138.5(C).  
 199. 1990 OK 82, 796 P.2d 1150. 
 200. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355(B) (2011). 
 201. Id.  
 202. See id. § 1355.1. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. § 1355A. 
 205. See id. § 1355.6(A) (guaranteeing representation in capital cases, felony cases, 
misdemeanor and traffic cases punishable by incarceration, “juvenile delinquency 
proceedings, adult certification proceedings, reverse certification proceedings, youthful 
offender proceedings,” and other cases pursuant to the Oklahoma Juvenile Code); see also 
id. § 1355.6(B) (giving the Executive Director the power to approve representation in other 
state proceedings when the “representation is related to the case for which the original 
appointment of the System was made” if the Act does not otherwise prohibit it). 
 206. See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text. 
 207. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355A(B)(1) (2011 & Supp. 2019). 
 208. See id. app. § XIII, form 13.3.  
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have been unable to obtain private counsel.
209
 Furthermore, courts similarly 
send a copy of all applications to the prosecuting attorney and, upon request 
by any party, will hold indigency determination hearings.
210
 If applicants 
post bond, other than by recognizance, the court may consider that fact in 
determining eligibility for appointed counsel, as long as such payment of 
bond is not the sole factor in determining whether an applicant is 
indigent.
211
 Unlike applicants seeking representation by a public defender, 
those applying under the Act must pay a $40 application fee.
212
 However, if 
the court determines that the applicant lacks financial wherewithal, the 
court may defer the fee until conviction.
213
  
Pursuant to the Indigent Defense Act, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals promulgated Rule 1.14 to establish the factors that courts should 
consider when determining an applicant’s indigency status.
214
 The court 
elected to follow the guidelines set forth in Cleek v. Oklahoma,
215
 In re 
Humphrey,
216
 and Bruner v. Oklahoma.
217
 Thus, an applicant’s indigency 
determination depends on consideration of the following factors: 
1. Ability and decision to post appeal bond; 
2. Availability of liquid assets; 
3. Debts and liabilities; 
4. Financial history; 
5. Income potential and living expenses; 
6. Credit standing; 
7. Family size and number of dependents; and 
8. Ability and willingness of family members to provide financial 
assistance.
218
 
                                                                                                             
 209. Id. § 1355A(A). 
 210. Id. § 1355A(C). 
 211. Id. § 1355A(D).  
 212. Id. § 1355A(A). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. R. 1.14(A)(1). 
 215. 1987 OK CR 278, ¶ 5, 748 P.2d 39, 40, overruled on other grounds by Norton v. 
Oklahoma, 2002 OK CR 10, 43 P.3d 404. 
 216. 1979 OK CR 97, ¶ 14, 601 P.2d 103, 108. 
 217. 1978 OK CR 65, ¶ 7, 581 P.2d 1314, 1317–18. 
 218. OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. R. 1.14(A)(1). 
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Consulting these factors, the Chief Judge, or the Chief Judge’s designee, 
determines whether the applicant is indigent and thus eligible for 
representation by OIDS.
219
 Once an applicant has been declared indigent, 
the case will be handled by an attorney appointed on a coordinated 
assignment basis
220
 or by the attorney, or group of attorneys, who has 
secured the contract to represent indigent criminal defendants and indigent 
juveniles in a given jurisdiction for a certain period.
221
 
Contracts for noncapital trial representation are available annually and 
become open for bidding should the previous holder elect not to renew an 
existing contract for the next fiscal year, or should the Board elect to solicit 
new offers.
222
 When the Board decides not to renew a contract, the 
Executive Director publishes a notice in the Oklahoma Bar Journal inviting 
offers for the upcoming year.
223
 Such notice must include information 
regarding attorney qualifications, the contract period, and a description of 
services to be rendered.
224
 Members of the Oklahoma Bar Association in 
good standing are eligible to bid on contracts,
225
 and the Board accepts the 
best offer (or offers) after considering the following factors: 
1. “Whether the attorney or attorneys submitting the offer maintain 
an office within th[e] county”; 
2. Whether the office is the attorney’s or attorneys’ primary office; 
3. Whether the attorney or attorneys have a contract in another 
county; 
4. Whether the attorneys included in the offer can handle the cases 
to be covered; and 
5. The accessibility of the attorney or attorneys to clients requiring 
representation.
226
 
Contracts awarded under the Act are fixed-price contracts,
227
 but cases 
assigned under the coordinated assignment program or not otherwise 
                                                                                                             
 219. Id. 
 220. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355.6(C) (2011). 
 221. See id. § 1355.8 (providing a framework to award contracts for representation of 
indigent criminal defendants). 
 222. Id. § 1355.8(A). 
 223. Id. § 1355.8(B). 
 224. Id. § 1355.8(B)(2)–(4). 
 225. Id. § 1355.8(C). 
 226. Id. § 1355.8(D)(1)(a)–(e). 
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covered by a fiscal year noncapital trial contract follow a fixed-fee-per case 
arrangement.
228
 Assigned cases are subject to statutory maximums that vary 
depending on the type of case.
229
 
B. Consequences of Oklahoma’s Two-Pronged Approach 
1. Surface-level Benefits 
Oklahoma’s indigent defense system was designed to be as cost-effective 
as possible.
230
 Public defender systems enjoy economies of scale by 
employing dedicated legal, investigative, and support staffs to serve 
indigent persons in high population areas like Oklahoma City and Tulsa.
231
 
Public defender offices lend themselves to the division of labor, which 
facilitates more productive operations. While growing caseloads may 
threaten public defenders offices’ ability to provide the same quality of 
service to a broader client base, specialized organizations are better 
positioned to respond to increased demands at only marginally higher 
costs.
232
 
Similarly, the predominantly fixed-price contract system that OIDS 
employs makes it cheaper to provide services in less populated areas.
233
 
Where a solo practitioner or small practice can manage an entire city or 
county’s caseload, as small-town criminal defense attorneys may 
sometimes do, it may not make sense to establish a bureaucratic system. 
Additionally, awarding the majority of cases through fixed-price contracts 
helps keep costs down and appropriations predictable. Once the Board 
awards contracts for a given fiscal year, OIDS can project, with an above-
average degree of certainty, what its yearly expenses will be. However, 
                                                                                                             
 227. See supra notes 168–75 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra notes 176–79 and accompanying text. 
 229. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355.8(F) (establishing a maximum compensation of $3500 
for felony cases and $800 for other cases, subject to Executive Director and Board approval 
of additional compensation in exceptional cases that require “extraordinary amount[s] of 
time to litigate” and for which a “request for extraordinary attorney fees is reasonable”). 
 230. Oklahoma Indigent Defense System, STATE OF OKLA., https://www.ok.gov/OIDS/ 
(last visited May 21, 2020). 
 231. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Ivillegas, City Controller: Public Defender Provides Most Cost-Efficient Means 
of Representing Poor, S.F. PUB. DEF. (June 24, 2009), http://sfpublicdefender.org/ 
news/2009/06/city-controller-public-defender-provides-most-cost-efficient-means-of-
representing-poor/. 
 233. See supra notes 219–21. 
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these cost savings negatively affect the populations they were created to 
serve, to the detriment of every arrested indigent. 
2. The Human Cost of Prioritizing Efficiency over Equity 
Despite—or perhaps because of—the economic incentives that motivate 
the current system, Oklahoma has constructed an indigent defense 
apparatus that suffers from all the negative consequences that the ABA 
seeks to discourage in its suggested standards.
234
 The most egregious 
characteristic is that the system relies heavily on fixed-price contracts to 
provide indigent defense services in 97% of Oklahoma counties.
235
 While 
fixed-price contracts may help keep expenditures under control, they 
substantially limit the quality of service that the most vulnerable criminal 
defendants receive. 
The fixed-price contract system creates perverse incentives that place the 
interests of attorneys directly at odds with those of their clients.
236
 Because 
contract attorneys earn a flat monthly rate regardless of the time that they 
dedicate to each case, they lack an incentive to provide their clients with 
significant representation. Instead, the system’s incentive structure 
encourages cutting corners on research and writing and negotiating plea 
deals in cases that should not be plead out. As a result, indigent clients 
receive inferior representation that falls short of the constitutional guarantee 
of effective counsel. 
Fixed-price contracts also negatively affect the attorneys who represent 
clients under their terms. By inadvertently encouraging attorneys across the 
state to provide lower quality services, the OIDS system exposes attorneys 
to an increased risk of grievances and sanctions by the Oklahoma Bar 
Association. Furthermore, requiring attorneys to manage caseloads that far 
exceed national recommendations and ABA standards diminishes their 
ability to be proud of their work and confidence that they are doing all they 
can for every client.
237
 These economic and emotional consequences 
contribute to attorney burnout, reducing the supply of individuals with the 
training, skill, and passion for representing indigent clients. 
                                                                                                             
 234. See supra notes 168–75 and accompanying text.  
 235. See supra notes 191–92 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 168–75 and accompanying text. 
 237. See Andrew Cohen, The Most Overworked, Underfunded ‘Army’ in American 
History, ATLANTIC (July 1, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/ 
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emotional consequences of overburdening public defenders). 
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IV. Proposed Reforms 
Since the Prison Policy Initiative released its 2018 statistics that 
recognized Oklahoma as the leading incarcerator in the world,
238
 Oklahoma 
has made limited progress toward reducing the incarcerated population.
239
 
In May 2019, the Legislature passed HB 1269.
240
 The bill made SQ 780, a 
2016 ballot initiative which made simple drug possession a misdemeanor 
instead of a felony, retroactive.
241
 HB 1269 also created the Pardon and 
Parole Board, which was tasked with reviewing commutation applications 
by individuals serving sentences for simple possession. And on November 
4, 2019, 462 Oklahomans were released in the largest single-day 
commutation in U.S. history.
242
  
Unsurprisingly, this measure overwhelmingly favored individuals with 
the financial resources to hire an attorney to complete an application on 
their behalf.
243
 And, as a criminal justice analyst at the Oklahoma Policy 
Institute recognized, “For Oklahoma, the preferred solution to almost any 
infraction [remains] incarceration.”
244
 Notwithstanding the passage of HB 
1269, the Oklahoma Legislature has failed to pass any meaningful criminal 
justice bills since the state first gained its reputation as the leading 
incarcerator in the world.
245
 And in its 2020 budget request, the Oklahoma 
Department of Corrections included $884 million to build 5200 new beds in 
                                                                                                             
 238. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 239. See Bret Shulte, Oklahoma Focuses on Criminal Justice Reform, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 
31, 2019, 8:41 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2019-10-31/ 
oklahoma-focuses-on-criminal-justice-reform. 
 240. See Damion Shade, HB 1269 Makes 780 Retroactive But Leaves Issues Unresolved, 
OKPOLICY.ORG.: OKLA. POL’Y INST. (May 23, 2019), https://okpolicy.org/hb-1269-makes-
780-retroactive-but-leaves-issues-unresolved/. 
 241. See id. 
 242. See Joshua Bote, Hundreds of Oklahoma Inmates to be Freed, The Largest Mass 
Release in US History, USA TODAY (Nov. 4, 2010, 10:09 AM ET), https://www.usatoday. 
com/story/news/nation/2019/11/04/hundreds-oklahoma-inmates-released-largest-
commutation-history/4154598002/. 
 243. See Shade, supra note 240. 
 244. Shulte, supra note 239 (quoting Damion Shade, criminal Analyst for Oklahoma 
Policy Institute). 
 245. See Quinton Chandler, Legislators Leave Criminal Justice Reform Bills on the Table 
as Prison Population Grows, STATEIMPACT OKLA. (May 30, 2019, 3:18 PM), 
https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2019/05/30/legislators-leave-criminal-justice-reform-
bills-on-the-table-as-prison-population-grows/. 
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its facilities that were operating at over 110% capacity.
246
 The lack of 
political will to pass measures that help the most vulnerable criminal 
defendants and never-ending desire to increase facility capacity reinforces 
the need for pretrial reforms that actually address the crux of the 
incarceration issue: the criminalization of poverty and eagerness to prey 
upon the misfortunes of indigent persons. 
Although it may be enticing to operate state government in a way that 
decreases spending on social services,
247
 indigent defense deserves to be 
adequately funded and systematically reformed in ways that restore the 
dignity of the poorest and most vulnerable citizens. If criminal justice 
systems are judged by how effectively they deliver justice to their most 
vulnerable citizens, Oklahoma’s is failing miserably. The following reforms 
address pretrial proceedings in ways that, if implemented together, would 
provide indigent criminal defendants with higher quality representation, 
reduce prison and jail populations, and disrupt powerful systems of 
oppression that perpetuate poverty and criminality. These reforms also 
illustrate that the Oklahoma Legislature has an arsenal of tools at its 
disposal if it actually wants to address the state’s ongoing incarceration 
crisis. 
A. Replace the Fixed-Price OIDS Contract System with a Statewide Public 
Defender Program 
First, the Oklahoma Legislature should abandon the fixed-price contract 
system that incentivizes attorneys who provide indigent defense services to 
allocate minimal time and resources to individual cases.
248
 While assigned 
counsel programs dominated the indigent defense landscape in the lead up 
to the landmark decisions in Gideon and Argersinger,
249
 public defender 
systems became commonplace in metropolitan areas following the Supreme 
Court’s sweeping mandate.
250
 But even as metropolitan areas increasingly 
                                                                                                             
 246. Oklahoma Board of Corrections Approves State System 2020 Budget Request, 
OKLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS (Oct. 30, 2018), http://doc.ok.gov/oklahoma-board-of-
corrections-approves-state-prison-system-2020-budget-request. 
 247. Cf. Matt Grossmann, Republican Control in the States Hasn’t Stopped the Growth 
of Government, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 10, 2019, 11:33 AM), https://fivethirtyeight. 
com/features/republican-control-in-the-states-hasnt-stopped-the-growth-of-government/ 
(explaining that Republication legislators often promise to avoid expanding social services). 
 248. See supra notes 168–73 and accompanying text. 
 249. See AM. BAR ASS’N, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS CONCERNING FIXED PRICE 
CONTRACTS FOR REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 1 (1996). 
 250. Id. 
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adopted public defender models, rising costs threatened their desirability, 
and legislatures across the country—especially those responsible for 
implementing programs that saved money in smaller, rural jurisdictions—
shifted toward contract systems like OIDS in the 1970s.
251
 But the growing 
number of indigent defendants requiring appointed counsel limits the 
effectiveness of contract systems that prioritize cost savings.
252
 The 
national—and Oklahoma—trend toward prioritizing cost savings over 
judicial efficiency and high-quality indigent defense services bolsters 
concerns about whether indigent defendants receive constitutionally 
adequate representation.
253
 Chief among these concerns is that emphasizing 
cost will lead to lower-quality services.
254
 
In 2015, the ACLU of Idaho sued the state over “its unconstitutional 
system of public defense, which deprive[d] thousands of Idahoans of their 
Sixth Amendment right to adequate legal representation.”
255
 The class-
action suit challenged the state’s combination public defender and fixed-
price contract system.
256
 The Idaho system, analogous to that in Oklahoma, 
operated with such inadequate resources that indigents who sued the state 
received bail amounts that they could not afford, spent weeks or months in 
jail, and lacked access to investigative help.
257
 Though the Idaho 
Legislature passed the Public Defense Act in 2014 to ban fixed-price 
contracts, nineteen out of forty-four counties still used fixed-price contracts 
at the time the suit was filed.
258
 Although the trial court originally dismissed 
the lawsuit in January 2016, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed in 2017 and 
allowed the case to proceed.
259
 
                                                                                                             
 251. See id. 
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 254. See id. 
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al-vs-state-idaho-et-al (last updated Nov. 27, 2019). “The case is currently back on appeal in 
 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/6
2020]       COMMENTS 955 
 
 
While the Idaho commission tasked with adopting new standards and 
implementing new procedures following the prohibition on fixed-price 
contracts failed to deliver, the Oklahoma Legislature should follow suit by 
banning fixed-price contracts. Banning these contracts may require 
reforming the entire OIDS system and, in turn, allocating more taxpayer 
money to indigent defense, but doing so would increase the quality of 
indigent defense services by removing contradictory incentives that pit 
providers against receivers. While abandoning the fixed-price contract 
system would allow the Legislature to alter the underlying incentive 
structures that prevent indigent defendants from receiving adequate 
representation, such a reform does not go far enough to address Oklahoma’s 
unparalleled incarceration crisis. 
B. Provide Indigent Defendants with Counsel at Bail Hearings 
The Oklahoma Legislature should also consider recognizing bail 
hearings—sometimes called initial appearances—as critical proceedings. 
Doing so would ensure the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at indigent 
defendants’ first appearance before a judge.
260
 Having appointed counsel 
present at bail hearings would ensure that those who are most susceptible to 
sit in jail pending trial have a chance to argue in favor of reduced or 
recognizance bond. While determinations of what constitutes a critical 
proceeding have historically occupied the province of the judicial branch, 
the Oklahoma Legislature possesses the authority to decide matters of 
public policy concerning the availability of defense counsel for indigent 
defendants at pretrial proceedings.
261
 
Should the Legislature be unwilling to act, the courts could also 
guarantee indigent defendants counsel at bail hearings. Though the 
Supreme Court has never decided the issue of whether the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel applies at a bail hearing, it came close in 
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Texas.
262
 In Rothgery, an indigent sued a 
Texas county for refusing to appoint him a lawyer until six months after his 
                                                                                                             
the Idaho Supreme Court—this time to determine the proper legal standard to be used in this 
case and in public defense reform cases more generally.” Id. 
 260. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224–25 (1967). 
 261. As an example of this legislative authority, the Indigent Defense Act has a provision 
that allows indigents to be represented in other state proceedings (such as pretrial 
proceedings) not specifically enumerated within the Act upon approval by the Executive 
Director. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355.6(A)–(B) (2011). 
 262. 554 U.S. 191 (2008). 
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initial appearance.
263
 The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel 
attached at the initial appearance but did so without deciding whether a bail 
hearing is a critical stage.
264
 Consequently, the Court failed to mandate that 
the right to counsel attaches at or before the bail hearing, as opposed to 
after the bail hearing. 
However, in the time since Rothgery, the New York Court of Appeals 
and Connecticut Supreme Court have determined that bail proceedings are 
critical stages that require the presence of counsel.
265
 The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court should follow suit and declare that the importance of the 
assistance of counsel at proceedings where courts may impose potentially 
prohibitive bail amounts justifies granting the right to counsel at initial 
appearances. Doing so would help propel a national trend toward 
guaranteeing counsel at bail hearings while contributing to ending the 
practice of incarcerating poor individuals before they have even been 
proven guilty. Should the Oklahoma Supreme Court choose not to interpret 
the Sixth Amendment how the New York and Connecticut courts did, it 
could accomplish the same outcome within the state using article 2, section 
20 of the Oklahoma Constitution, which guarantees a state right to 
counsel.
266
 Though guaranteeing indigent criminal defendants the right to 
counsel at bail hearings will reduce the number of individuals who spend 
prolonged periods in jail awaiting trial, it will not address the issue as 
effectively as rectifying the bail system at large. 
C. Mandatory Recognizance Bonds for Nonviolent Crimes 
While guaranteeing the right to counsel at bail hearings would reduce the 
likelihood that an indigent is incarcerated, wholly eliminating cash bond for 
nonviolent crimes would eliminate the need for counsel at such hearings in 
more than 80% of cases.
267
 Jurisdictions across the country are beginning to 
implement similar reforms to limit the extent to which the criminal justice 
system punishes indigent defendants for their financial misfortunes.
268
 
                                                                                                             
 263. Id. at 196–97. 
 264. See id. at 213. 
 265. Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 930 N.E.2d 217, 223 (N.Y. 2010); Gonzalez v. 
Comm’r of Corr., 68 A.3d 624, 635–36 (Conn.), cert. denied, 751 U.S. 1045 (2013). 
 266. See OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20 (protecting the “[r]ights of accused in criminal 
cases”). 
 267. See OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 1-2 (showing that 
nonviolent crimes accounted for roughly 85% of reported index crimes in Oklahoma in 
2018). 
 268. See infra notes 269–80 and accompanying text. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/6
2020]       COMMENTS 957 
 
 
Reform efforts in Georgia, Illinois, and New York offer blueprints that the 
Oklahoma Legislature could consider in reducing its reliance on a wealth-
based test for determining pretrial release. 
In February 2018, Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms signed an 
ordinance that eliminated cash bond requirements for certain low-level 
offenses.
269
 The ordinance gives the Atlanta Detention Center authority to 
release individuals charged with nonviolent misdemeanors or city ordinance 
violations on their own recognizance.
270
 Though the state bail-bond 
industry opposed the measure, the Atlanta City Council voted 13-0 in 
favor.
271
 When asked about the ordinance, Mayor Bottoms replied, “There 
are poor people who don’t have resources to get out of jail . . . it ma[kes] no 
fiscal sense to hold someone who cannot post a $500 bond at a cost to 
taxpayers of thousands of dollars.”
272
 Fulton County, where Atlanta is 
located, also passed an ordinance that eliminated cash bail for violations of 
county ordinances and certain misdemeanors.
273
 According to Robb Pitts, 
Chairman of the Fulton County Board of Commissioners, the change will 
save the county seventy-seven dollars per day per inmate.
274
 Based on 
Oklahoma’s estimated 4000 inmates who are held in jails pretrial despite 
not yet being convicted,
275
 an estimated 80% of whom committed 
nonviolent crimes, such a change could amount to nearly $250,000 in 
savings per day. 
In May 2015, the Illinois Legislature passed Senate Bill 202, which 
guarantees that defendants “accused of nonviolent crimes such as 
trespassing,” will be released without bond if their case lasts thirty days or 
                                                                                                             
 269. See Keith Whitney, Atlanta, Fulton County Looks to Eliminate Cash-Bonds for Non-
Violent, Minor Crimes, CBS 46 [ATLANTA] (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.cbs46.com/news/ 
atlanta-fulton-county-looks-to-eliminate-cash-bonds-for-non/article_e9d70c4c-3614-55f3-
8d35-c39270b5b7ce.html. 
 270. Rhonda Cook, Atlanta Mayor Signs New Ordinance Changing Cash Bail System in 
a Nod to the Needy, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.myajc.com/news/local/ 
atlanta-council-oks-changes-cash-bail-system-nod-the-needy/SW50dABJAtWgBwpB4vtg 
BN/. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms). 
 273. Carson Cook, Fulton Passes Measure to Ease Bail Requirement, N. FULTON (Oct. 8, 
2018), https://www.northfulton.com/news/fulton-passes-measure-to-ease-bail-requirement/ 
article_251ee1d2-cb5c-11e8-8e75-bfbce99237ae.html. 
 274. Whitney, supra note 269.  
 275. See Oklahoma Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/ 
profiles/OK.html (last visited May 20, 2020). 
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longer.
276
 Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart, who proposed the bill, asserted, 
“These folks are nonviolent, not dangerous. They are in here because of 
inertia built into a large system.”
277
 By releasing defendants who cannot 
afford to post bond after thirty days, Cook County stands to save $143 per 
day per inmate.
278
 If Oklahoma were to adopt a similar policy, using the 
same numbers as above,
279
 this could lead to more than $450,000 in daily 
savings. In July 2016, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio launched a 
program that released approximately 3400 of the city’s inmates under a 
monitored supervision program.
280
  
Oklahoma stands to benefit significantly should it choose to implement a 
similar system for nonviolent offenses. While bail is not supposed to be 
imposed as a punishment,
281
 it often becomes punitive when imposed 
against indigent criminal defendants.
282
 Requiring individuals to remain in 
jail because they cannot afford to purchase their temporary freedom goes 
far beyond the government interest in ensuring appearance at court dates 
and serves no legitimate purpose. For example, in Washington, D.C., most 
criminal defendants are released on recognizance bonds, yet the city still 
boasts “an 89% court appearance rate.”
283
 Reliance on outdated cash bail 
practices serves no other purpose than to criminalize and perpetuate poverty 
among those classes of individuals who are most susceptible to it. However, 
if the Oklahoma Legislature truly wants to address the state’s incarceration 
crisis and remedy the injustices being effectuated against the state’s poorest 
citizens, it should go even a step further. 
D. Abolish Cash Bail Entirely 
Finally, the Oklahoma Legislature should abolish cash bail entirely. 
While this proposition may sound like an excessive step to take in 
implementing criminal justice reform, it gets to the root of the issue that 
indigent criminal defendants face when they find themselves at a bail 
hearing. Rather than conditioning one’s freedom on wealth, systems that 
                                                                                                             
 276. Fiona Ortiz, Poor, Nonviolent Inmates Benefit from U.S. Bail Reform Push, 
REUTERS (July 16, 2015, 10:36 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-chicago-bail-
idUSKCN0PQ1UN20150716. 
 277. Id. (quoting Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart).  
 278. Id. 
 279. Oklahoma Profile, supra note 275. 
 280. Ortiz, supra note 276. 
 281. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 128–37 and accompanying text. 
 283. Ortiz, supra note 276. 
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reject the premise of the cash bail system treat bail hearings as they were 
intended.
284
 
In August 2018, “California . . . became the first state to fully abolish 
cash bail.”
285
 The California Money Bail Reform Act
286
 ensured that 
suspects accused of crimes “will be evaluated on the basis of risk to public 
safety and the likelihood of not appearing in court, rather than on his or her 
ability to post a certain bail amount.”
287
 Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice 
of the California Supreme Court, lauded the law as “a fair and just solution 
for all Californians.”
288
  
Under the new system, the California Judicial Council, tasked with 
setting state court rules, would create a new system for assessing suspects 
as “low risk,” “medium risk,” and “high risk.”
289
 Courts would be able to 
detain suspects “if there is a substantial likelihood that no condition or 
combination of conditions of pretrial supervision will reasonably assure 
public safety or the appearance of the person in court.”
290
 While supporters 
claimed that the law would end wealth-based discrimination in the setting 
of bail, opponents feared that it gave courts too much power.
291
 
Natasha Minsker, Director for the ACLU of California Center for 
Advocacy & Policy,
292
 worried that the new statute “lacks protections 
against racial bias.”
293
 Some legislators also expressed concerns that the 
state rushed to pass a bill involving complex issues that deserved more 
time.
294
 The Essie Justice Group feared that the law “gives too much 
discretion to prosecutors” and may lead to “incarceration without any due 
process.”
295
 
                                                                                                             
 284. See supra notes 124–27. 
 285. Thomas Fuller, California Is the First State to Scrap Cash Bail, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/us/california-cash-bail.html. 
 286. S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 287. Fuller, supra note 285. 
 288. Id. (quoting Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. (quoting the law itself). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Natasha Minsker, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/natasha-minsker-7742 
7019 (last visited May 21, 2020). 
 293. Fuller, supra note 285 (quoting Natasha Minsker, advocate for California ACLU). 
 294. Id.  
 295. Id. (quoting statement from Essie Justice).  
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Unfortunately, the California bail bill has been put on hold pending a 
referendum in November 2020.
296
 Following the law’s passage in 2018, a 
national coalition of the two-billion-dollar bail lobby organized a 
referendum drive and gathered enough signatures to put the issue to a 
vote.
297
 Despite this setback, the bill’s original author is confident that the 
voters will approve the measure.
298
 In the meantime, at least eleven counties 
are experimenting with pilot programs to reduce the number of people in 
jail, and approximately fifty counties have started using risk assessment 
tools to determine which defendants qualify for release.
299
 
Though the California Legislature may have rushed the legislation 
without taking time to work through all the details, Oklahoma can change 
the way its criminal justice system works by passing similar legislation. 
Thankfully, Oklahoma could convene a task force to study the California 
county pilot programs and risk assessment tools to determine which ones 
mitigate risks that opponents of California’s bill raised. A new risk-based 
system that only considers risks of flight and public safety would reduce the 
likelihood that indigent criminal defendants are unjustly jailed for minor 
crimes. And with the power of hindsight, the Oklahoma Legislature could 
also address those areas that the California bill failed to consider.  
To limit the courts’ and prosecutors’ discretion, the Oklahoma 
Legislature could enumerate certain crimes for which detention should be 
mandatory. Such a system would result in mandatory pretrial detention for 
certain individuals who might otherwise be eligible for release on a sizable 
bond, but it would be a step in the right direction by basing pretrial 
detention on the offense charged rather than the defendant’s financial 
resources. If the purpose of pretrial detention is to limit risks of flight and 
danger to public safety, it should be reserved for individuals who pose such 
risks, not those who are simply too poor to afford their freedom. 
Conclusion 
Oklahoma’s incarceration crisis is part of a national trend, not an isolated 
occurrence.
300
 Despite the regularity with which states construct and 
                                                                                                             
 296. See Jazmine Ulloa, California’s Historic Overhaul of Cash Bail is Now on Hold, 
Pending a 2020 Referendum, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2019, 7:25 PM), https://www.latimes. 
com/politics/la-pol-ca-bail-overhaul-referendum-20190116-story.html. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.  
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administer two-tiered criminal justice systems that criminalize poverty, 
Oklahoma’s system deserves special attention. The state’s status as the 
highest incarcerator per capita in the entire world
301
 makes it an ideal 
candidate to implement comprehensive reforms. 
Though cost savings have historically driven legislative and executive 
decisions regarding the administration of the state’s indigent defense 
system, continued reliance on the same policies will only serve to aggravate 
the incarceration crisis. The only sensible way to address Oklahoma’s 
broken system is to reform the pretrial policies that disproportionately 
impact the most vulnerable criminal defendants—those who are too poor to 
afford to get out of jail. While criminal justice reforms that will reverse the 
troubling trends toward relentless incarceration may require initial 
expenditures in the form of increased appropriations for indigent defense, 
the state stands to offset many of its short-term costs in the long term.  
Each of the proposed reforms will produce an economic benefit once its 
effects are realized.
302
 Ending fixed-price contracts may increase short-term 
costs for statewide indigent defense services, but higher quality 
representation will reduce the costs associated with incarcerating innocent 
defendants for crimes they did not commit.
303
 This is true during both the 
pretrial stage and post-conviction. Reducing the number of beds occupied 
by innocent indigents will save city and county governments funds, and 
reducing the number of individuals who plead guilty to crimes they did not 
commit will do the same for the state government. Better representation 
would ensure that prosecutors give guilty defendants access to information 
that helps reduce the length of their sentences, and it will also make it less 
likely that an innocent indigent either pleads guilty or gets convicted at 
trial. Ensuring the right to counsel at bail hearings may cost judicial 
resources on the front end but would simultaneously reduce the strain on 
overcrowded jails. Eliminating cash bail—either for nonviolent crimes or 
all crimes—may raise pretrial supervision costs but would significantly 
curtail spending on pretrial detention. 
                                                                                                             
 301. Matt Clarke, Oklahoma Is Number One ... in Incarceration Rates, PRISON LEGAL 
NEWS (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2019/feb/5/oklahoma-number-
one-incarceration-rates/.  
 302. For example, Georgia and Illinois saved $77 and $143 per inmate per day, 
respectively, through their reform efforts. See supra notes 274, 278.  
 303. Cf. Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 157, at 35 (explaining that contract 
programs for representing indigent defendants sacrifice quality for low cost).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
962 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:923 
 
 
These proposed reforms, whether implemented individually or together, 
would reduce the strain on overcrowded prisons and jails. They would also 
save taxpayer funds that would otherwise be spent on incarcerating poor 
criminal defendants. Though the exact short-term financial costs are 
difficult to predict, the long-term financial and societal benefits of 
reforming pretrial procedures far exceed any such expenditure. Finally—
and perhaps most importantly—these reforms would help restore the 
dignity of the most vulnerable individuals in the criminal justice system and 
send a clear signal that our legislators truly care about all citizens, not just 
the wealthy. 
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